China’s Dual-Use Infrastructure in the Pacific

CDT noted last month that recent Chinese naval exercises around Australia had sparked a spike in comments on Chinese social media advocating the conquest of Australia. While some may have been a joke, others appeared serious, and were taken seriously by commentators such as current affairs and science blogger Xiang Dongliang, who wrote: “Popular sentiment really has shifted. My heartfelt prayer, as a humble science blogger: May Buddha bless and protect us.”

While the occupation of a three-million-square-mile island nearly two thousand miles from China might charitably be described as fanciful, China’s development of capabilities to project maritime power further across the region is more grounded in reality. A new report from Domingo I-Kwei Yang at the Prague-based Sinopsis also takes the recent naval exercises as a starting point, arguing that economic and commercial activities carried out under the Belt and Road Initiative lay foundations for potential future militarization. From the report’s introduction:

In February 2025, Australia, New Zealand, and regional actors were caught off guard when the PLA conducted live-fire exercises there with little notice, forcing dozens of flights to reroute. The incident served as a wake-up call, highlighting China’s expanding military reach beyond the Third Island Chain [[See background on the Pacific’s strategic island chains]. China’s military presence in the Pacific will continue to grow, driven by its expanding hegemonic ambitions in the region. China has been steadily building its military capabilities and extending its security sphere through infrastructure projects in the Pacific for many years.

China’s military reach is hidden, embedded in its foreign investments and Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) projects. While research on the BRI has expanded since 2013, most studies focus on economics and foreign aid, downplaying its security and military dimensions. Even as China’s overseas basing ambitions draw attention—especially after its first military base in Djibouti in 2017—the security risks of its Pacific infrastructure projects remain largely ignored.

[…] This policy paper explores whether China is preparing to weaponise its infrastructure in the Pacific to strengthen its hard power presence. It first analyses the strategic nature of the BRI in the region, arguing that China’s geopolitical ambitions outweigh its economic objectives. It then identifies four key categories of strategic infrastructure: ports and wharves, fishery facilities, aeronautical hubs, and ICT networks. The paper further explores how these assets could be militarised before assessing China’s long-term strategy for leveraging them in the Pacific.

This paper argues that China uses its development projects in the Pacific as covert infrastructures to advance the PLA’s force projection toward the Third Island Chain. Far from serving purely economic interests, these projects act as force multipliers—tangible and intangible assets that enhance military capability and strategic value. Through dualuse infrastructure, technology, software, and hardware, China expands its influence and strengthens its military reach. In a transition from peace to war, these assets could be weaponised to restrict regional actors’ freedom of action. [Source]

The paper concludes:

If China consolidates control over […] strategic nodes, it could manipulate trade flows, disrupt global markets, and exert political pressure on both regional and global actors. Countries that rely on open and secure sea lanes—such as the U.S., Japan, Australia, New Zealand, and the Pacific small island developing states—must recognise the long-term risks posed by China’s infrastructures located at geostrategic chokepoints.

Ultimately, China’s expansion in the Pacific is not only about territorial influence but about shaping the future balance of power. Chinese infrastructure projects have the potential to become military footholds and multiply power projection capability. A proactive response—through strengthened alliances, strategic investments, and regional cooperation—is essential to preserving peace and stability. For the U.S., its allies, and regional actors, this is not just about countering China; it is about defending a free, open, and rules-based international order in the Pacific. [Source]

The report ends with a set of recommendations emphasizing the importance of solidarity and collaboration with allies across the region.

China’s reliance on dual-use resources was also highlighted in a recent New York Times report on the development of new landing barges apparently intended for use in the event of an invasion of Taiwan:

The satellite images did not show any vehicles actually being unloaded. But ferries and cargo ships that took part were of a kind built or modified to handle heavy armed vehicles, like armored personnel vehicles or even tanks, said Jason Wang, the chief operating officer of ingeniSPACE, a company that analyzes satellite images and other data, including about the Chinese military.

Taiwan’s western coastline, facing the Chinese mainland, has relatively few beaches or ports where landing is easy, and those areas are relatively well guarded. The barges would theoretically enable China to pick other areas on Taiwan’s coast that might be more difficult to land on but are less defended, from which to come ashore, several experts said.

[…] “China still doesn’t have enough gray hull naval ships to assault Taiwan’s main island on their own,” Mr. Wang said, referring to the typical color of warships. But when you add specialized dual-use ferries and cargo ships, “then that becomes a different story,” he said.

“You’re then starting to have enough vessels to be able to deliver a battalion on shore quickly,” he said. [Source]