Lawmakers hold a policy debate at the National Assembly on March 14, 2019, where they say it is time for South Korea to consider acquiring its own nuclear arms. (Yonhap)
Even after the US Department of Energy designated South Korea a “sensitive country,” prominent figures within the ruling People Power Party continue to call for the country to acquire its own nuclear capabilities.
These people fall into two main categories: those who want complete, self-sufficient nuclear armament, and those who want nuclear latency. Among those in the former group are Daegu Mayor Hoon Joon-pyo, Labor Minister Kim Moon-soo, and former lawmaker Yoo Seong-min, who want South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons. Former PPP leader Han Dong-hoon, lawmaker Ahn Cheol-soo, and Seoul Mayor Oh Se-hoon belong to the latter group and argue that since it’s infeasible to develop nuclear arms now, Korea should secure the potential to develop them when needed.
On March 17, Democratic Party leader Lee Jae-myung pointed to the PPP’s calls for nuclear armament as the reason behind South Korea’s designation as a sensitive country, calling them “inciteful posturing.” In response, Han said, “My argument is that we should secure nuclear latency by developing the technology for enrichment and reprocessing, becoming a nation that is capable of developing nuclear arms but hasn’t actually done so, like Japan.”
“That’s not posturing; it’s defending the Republic of Korea and keeping its people safe,” he said.
For South Korea to develop its own nuclear weapons, we would need both approval and support from the US, but as this is rather unrealistic, nuclear latency is being pitched as a viable alternative. The argument calls for developing the capacity for enrichment and reprocessing so that Korea can quickly build nuclear weapons when the need arises. After observing US President Donald Trump appeal to Russia in an effort to end the war in Ukraine, critics of the status quo are saying that we cannot rely on the US’ extended deterrence, which has led to an increase in the number of people advocating nuclear latency.
Is it possible for Korea to secure nuclear latency as some politicians and scholars suggest? First off, since little domestic research has been conducted on the concept, there is no national consensus on what level of nuclear development or capabilities actually constitutes nuclear latency. That is, there is no across-the-board agreement on how to quantitatively measure nuclear latency. Since standards and definitions vary from person to person, the Korean concept of nuclear latency is more of a word of the day than a technical term.
North Korea fires a Hwasong-18 ICBM. (KCNA/Yonhap)
Han and others are arguing that we should secure a nuclear latency level similar to that of Japan’s. This amounts to asking the US to give South Korea the same leeway when it comes to the nuclear fuel cycle from uranium enrichment to the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel rods. When comparing the nuclear agreement between South Korea and the US with the one between Japan and the US, Japan is given certain liberties when it comes to reprocessing spent nuclear fuel, while South Korea is limited to recycling (pyroprocessing) methods that guarantee that what’s left at the end cannot be used for weaponization.
South Korea can process low-enriched uranium (LEU), which has a U-235 concentration below 20%, but there are additional conditions in the agreement that make LEU production difficult in practice. South Korea’s agreement with the US does not pertain to highly enriched uranium (HEU), which has a U-235 concentration above 20%. Japan, conversely, has complete freedom when it comes to LEU and can even process HEU on a case-by-case basis when prior approval is granted. Any uranium that is enriched above 20% can be used for nuclear weapons production.
Those arguing for nuclear latency are somewhat disappointed in the US for not granting the same license to South Korea as it does to Japan. Ultimately, the US grants Japan greater freedom in reprocessing because Washington is confident that Tokyo will not use its nuclear fuel to build weapons.
Since 1967, Japan has followed the “three non-nuclear principles” of non-possession, non-production, and non-introduction. The country’s experience with nuclear radiation caused by the atomic bomb droppings of WWII instilled within its people a fundamental resistance to producing or possessing nuclear weapons, so the conversation of nuclear weaponization within Japan is a non-starter. Up until 2010, Japanese public opinion polls showed that only 10% of respondents supported their country developing nuclear weapons. Since 2020, however, North Korea’s advances in nuclear weaponry and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine have bumped that number up to 20%.
The Japanese government does not pursue nuclear weapons production in an official capacity, nor does the majority of its population want it to. Conversations about nuclear armament or nuclear latency, therefore, rarely show up in Japan’s public conversation. South Korea’s situation is the complete opposite.
Participants pose for a photo following a seminar held at the National Assembly on March 20, 2025, titled “Seminar on South Korea’s nuclear strategy in response to the realization of the North Korean nuclear threat.” (courtesy of the office of PPP lawmaker Lim Jong-deuk)
South Korean President Yoon Suk-yeol hinted at the possibility of Korea developing nuclear weapons in January 2023, and figures within his PPP have consistently argued for nuclear armament since. Recently, PPP lawmakers have been holding public seminars at the National Assembly regarding nuclear armament and nuclear latency. During one of these seminars, they proposed a petition to get 10 million signatures in support of nuclear armament as a viable option for countering the North Korean threat.
Surveys conducted last year by the Chey Institute for Advanced Studies, the Asan Institute for Policy Studies, and the Korea Institute for National Unification indicated that public support for nuclear armament exceeded 60%. Various opinion polls have shown that support for developing nuclear weapons has steadily stayed in the range of 60%-70% since 2000.
If South Korea wants to secure nuclear latency, it first needs to revise its nuclear agreement with the US. The South Korean government has openly discussed the option of nuclear latency as an alternative to nuclear armament, and the majority of the population wants the country to produce and possess nuclear weapons. In such a situation, it is unlikely that the US will revise its nuclear agreement with South Korea.
To secure nuclear latency, South Korea will need to reiterate its commitment to the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and show the US and the international community that it is a model of nuclear nonproliferation. Seoul needs to give them faith that it won’t develop nuclear weapons. Instead of terms like “nuclear latency,” which appears as a loophole for eventually developing weapons, we need to push concepts like the “peaceful use of nuclear energy.” Continuing to talk our heads off will only decrease our actual chances of nuclear latency.
By Kwon Hyuk-chul, staff reporter
Please direct questions or comments to [english@hani.co.kr]
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