During Ramadan, China’s ‘Muslim Diplomacy’ Unfolds in Indonesia – The Diplomat

Each year during Ramadan in Indonesia, the communal breaking of the fast serves not only as a religious observance but also as a platform for diplomatic engagement. As in previous years, during this year’s Ramadan, China is actively engaging with Indonesia’s largest Muslim organizations as part of its bid to strengthen its ties with the world’s largest Muslim-majority country. Notably, the Chinese embassy’s recent collaborations with the Lembaga Persahabatan Ormas Islam (LPOI), an Islamic organizational alliance in Indonesia led by Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), the country’s largest Muslim organization, encapsulate the ongoing expansion of China’s “Muslim diplomacy.”

On March 14, LPOI and the Chinese Embassy hosted a tadarus futuristik (futuristic Quran recitation) and iftar in Jakarta. The presence at the event of Chinese Ambassador Wang Lutong, who during a speech at the event acknowledged the historical ties between China and the Muslim world, underscored the importance of Beijing’s outreach to Indonesian Muslim leaders.

By providing Ramadan aid and participating in religious and cultural discussions, China is working to strengthen ties with Jakarta while addressing Indonesian Muslims’ concerns about its treatment of its own Muslim populations.

China’s soft power approach, particularly in Muslim diplomacy, has gained traction in Indonesia since 2019, when allegations of human rights abuses by the Chinese government against the country’s Uyghur Muslim population intensified. Over the past six years, Beijing has built relationships with Indonesia’s two largest Muslim organizations, Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) and Muhammadiyah, and has organized visits for Indonesian journalists and religious figures to communicate how Islam is practiced in China. Additionally, China has extended scholarships to Indonesian santris (Islamic boarding school students) and supported collaborations between Chinese academic institutions and Indonesian Islamic universities.

Most recently, last September, China established China Space, a cultural center located at Jakarta’s Istiqlal Mosque. This center, inaugurated by Zhou Kan, charge d’affaires of the Chinese Embassy, aims to promote Chinese culture in Indonesian society. According to the embassy, the facility aspires to be “an inclusive, shared and open space, making greater contributions to bilateral cultural, religious, and educational exchanges and cooperation.”

China has also provided financial assistance and supported projects in partnership with Indonesian Muslim organizations. Donations have been directed toward NU, while collaborations with Muhammadiyah have centered on education. For instance, in 2015, the Chinese Embassy contributed to NU-run orphanages, and in 2018, it funded sanitation facilities in NU-dominated villages in West Java.

Beyond the embassy level, Chinese consulates general in regional areas are also actively leveraging the Ramadan period for Muslim diplomacy. On March 12, the Chinese consulate in Medan collaborated with 10 Islamic organizations, including Islamic boarding schools, the Indonesian Ulema Council, and the North Sumatra chapter of NU, to distribute 1,500 boxes of essential goods. During this event, Zhang Min, the Chinese consul general, also delivered a positive narrative regarding the development of the Xinjiang region, home to most of China’s Uyghur population.

China’s diplomatic engagement with Indonesia’s Muslim organizations appears to serve multiple objectives. One aim is to promote the notion that Islam and China are compatible. By engaging with Indonesian Muslim leaders, Beijing seeks to address concerns about religious freedoms in its own country. In particular, China has worked to shape narratives around its policies in the western Xinjiang region, where it has faced international scrutiny over its treatment of Uyghur Muslims. Through partnerships with Indonesian Muslim organizations, China has sought to present its policies in a more favorable light.

Given the important role that Muslim organizations play in Indonesian politics, Beijing recognizes that securing support from these organizations could mitigate criticism within Muslim organizations, and across the Indonesian Muslim community more broadly, regarding Xinjiang. This approach aligns with China’s broader diplomatic strategy, including the Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to expand the trade and investment links between China and Indonesia.

During the tadarus and iftar event on March 14, LPOI chairman KH Said Aqil Siradj, who has previously visited China and shared favorable perspectives on the country, emphasized the importance of Indonesia and China working together to promote global harmony. References to the long-standing presence of Islam in China since the Tang Dynasty (618–907 AD) were reiterated as part of a broader narrative that the two nations’ historical friendship predated the modern era.

Over the years, China’s Muslim diplomacy in Indonesia has borne some fruit.

The most notable achievement from Beijing’s perspective is that Indonesia has been relatively silent on Xinjiang. In 2022, Indonesia was among the 18 nations that voted against a United Nations Human Rights Council motion to discuss China’s human rights abuses in Xinjiang. Perhaps concerned about the scrutiny of its own policies in regions like Papua, Jakarta dismissed the effort as political maneuvering, framing the Uyghur issue as China’s internal matter. At the same time, Muslim organizations in Indonesia have urged a cautious approach when addressing the Uyghur issue.

Indonesia was also notably silent about the recent deportation of 40 Uyghur asylum seekers from Thailand to China, an act that prompted international condemnation. Despite offers from third countries to resettle them, Bangkok proceeded with the deportation, with Thai officials later admitting that they feared retaliation from Beijing.

Indonesia’s stance contrasts sharply with its vocal condemnation of Myanmar’s persecution of the Rohingya and Israeli policies toward the Palestinians – a form of selective advocacy undermines its credibility as a principled defender of human rights.

Economic considerations have undoubtedly influenced the government’s stance on this issue. China is Indonesia’s second-largest foreign investor, and the two countries have become increasingly economically intertwined over the past two decades. Maintaining strong ties with China benefits both the Indonesian government and Muslim organizations, which often receive financial support, investments, and collaborative opportunities for development initiatives.

Ultimately, China’s Muslim diplomacy strategy aims to secure support from Indonesian Muslim groups, among the world’s largest, to legitimize its narrative on the Uyghur issue. This strategy has gained further relevance as Indonesian students returning from studies in China, particularly from Islamic boarding schools, propagate positive narratives about China through various media. These narratives tend to downplay criticism of China, despite the significant negative impact of some Chinese activities in Indonesia, notably in the extractive industries. To this end, China has consistently leveraged the Ramadan period each year to disseminate positive narratives about the country, including on the Xinjiang issue. Recent events exemplify this sustained effort to advance its Muslim diplomacy in Indonesia.

Furthermore, China has arguably benefited from the perceived diminishing of U.S. soft power in the region due to the Trump administration’s freeze on most foreign aid and support for foreign media organizations. This has created an opening for China to advance its own “Soft power” initiatives, and could well reinforce China’s visibility and engagement in the country. Consequently, China’s engagement with Indonesia’s Muslim communities is likely to evolve and expand, with consequences likely to extend significantly beyond the Ramadan season.