How COMAC Might Leverage Europe to Secure Aerospace Independence from the U.S.

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Last Updated on: 24th April 2025, 03:52 am

China’s equivalent to Boeing and Airbus, COMAC, faces a critical strategic inflection point, driven by intensifying geopolitical tensions and a trade war that the second Trump presidency intentionally added significant accelerant to. While China’s intent to compete with Boeing and Airbus through the C919 narrow body and the upcoming C929 wide body remains clear, the longstanding reliance on American aerospace components poses significant vulnerabilities. China has been following a domestic aerospace manufacturing competency strategy for 15 years, but the Trump trade war with its 145% tariffs on China and tariffs on every other country—except Russia—both multiply the risk and open opportunities.

This strategic assessment is triggered by my recent evaluation of the implications of China’s shutting down of domestic purchases of US passenger planes. My assessment dealt with the long decline of Boeing and its regulatory capture of the FAA, something I’d thought through in print before, but was viewing through the lens of a China attacked by Trump’s tariffs and responding in a multi-faceted way. Another lever China has pulled is licensing of critical minerals for export, requiring end country and use case to be clearly stated, with the obvious implication that things that benefit the USA would not receive approval. Among other things, this impacts US jet turbine manufacturing. On a different track, China has stopped buying US LNG, putting all final investment decisions on US LNG port proposals on even thinner ice. In the same vein, Trump’s extraordinary tariffs mean that the rest of the world, and especially Europe, have the opportunity to reduce their transformer delivery timelines, diverting Chinese export capacity that would have otherwise gone to the USA.

The piece about Boeing sales shut down resulted in a lot of remarks from US commenters who seemed somewhat divorced from the reality of China’s technological, R&D and aerospace advances. Among other things, they asserted that China couldn’t make jet engines or avionics. This struck me as both remarkably improbable, and as most likely an indication of western chauvinism regarding China’s technical competence and strategic foresight. Investigation ensued.

This piece is of a kind with my recent strategic projection of the rest of the world’s potential strategic shifts around Chinese semiconductors, with the fragile US-led blockade on China developing or acquiring the most advanced chips fracturing under the weight of US hostility to its allies. It’s been fascinating picking apart the geopolitical threads and considering how they might end up being rewoven. I’ll be speaking about some of that related to critical minerals to a global audience of institutional investors through Jefferies investment bank soon, along with a host of speakers I feel privileged to be among. But back to China’s domestic aerospace strategy.

Historically, COMAC has followed a careful, methodical strategy, collaborating extensively with global aerospace suppliers—including American giants such as GE Aviation, Honeywell, Collins Aerospace, and Parker Hannifin—to gradually build domestic aviation expertise. Engines, avionics, flight controls, and auxiliary systems have heavily leveraged U.S. technology, along with European OEMs. Though substantial progress has been made domestically—most notably with the CJ-1000A engine, China’s homegrown alternative to the CFM LEAP-1C engine—the pace has remained incremental rather than transformational.

Now, as geopolitical pressure intensifies, it’s likely COMAC will pivot toward Europe as its primary near-term strategic partner. European aerospace firms already deeply involved in COMAC programs—including Safran, Liebherr Aerospace, Thales, and Rolls-Royce—represent the logical bridge away from the U.S. market. European suppliers provide comparable technological capability, combined crucially with the credibility needed to maintain global market access via EASA certification pathways. The strategic calculus is straightforward: Europe, increasingly frustrated by America’s trade policies and technology export restrictions, will likely view expanded cooperation with China in aerospace as both politically palatable and commercially advantageous.

Under this scenario, COMAC would begin aggressively seeking European replacements for critical American-sourced aircraft systems. Safran, already a major participant in COMAC’s existing supply chain, would be the natural first port of call to substitute wheels, brakes, and possibly even auxiliary power units currently sourced from Honeywell. Safran’s extensive aviation credentials and EASA familiarity would expedite certification. Thales would likely step in to replace core avionics components and navigation systems traditionally sourced from Collins Aerospace and GE Aviation. Given Thales’ broad aerospace and defense expertise, this transition would also be eased by existing regulatory frameworks in Europe.

Similarly, Liebherr Aerospace, deeply embedded already in COMAC’s landing gear and environmental control systems, could readily expand into flight-control actuators, hydraulic systems, and fuel systems currently sourced from Parker Hannifin. Liebherr’s established joint ventures within China mean technology transfer and local production would not face major regulatory hurdles, creating a smoother pathway to full system integration.

On the engine front, while China continues to push the development of the CJ-1000A for the C919, COMAC may still consider interim measures involving European engines from Safran or Rolls-Royce, particularly if the CJ-1000A’s full EASA certification faces delays or difficulties. For the larger CR929 widebody, Rolls-Royce engines, such as the Trent 7000 series, would be strategically appealing as a non-American option capable of immediate global market acceptance. This European engine selection would not only ensure timely availability for early CR929 variants but would also enhance the credibility required for expedited EASA approvals.

This European pivot would simultaneously advance COMAC’s long-term goal of total aerospace self-sufficiency. By collaborating more closely with European firms, COMAC would acquire critical expertise through targeted technology transfer and joint ventures strategically positioned within China. These joint ventures, operating under clear localization mandates, would lay a foundation for eventual domestic substitution. European aerospace companies, motivated by market access and frustrated with U.S. trade practices, would likely find such terms commercially attractive enough to justify the risks inherent in technology sharing.

Moreover, COMAC would pursue a careful and deliberate certification strategy emphasizing cooperation with EASA. Given the increasingly unlikely prospect of FAA approval under ongoing U.S.-China tensions and the FAA regulatory capture by Boeing, EASA certification becomes pivotal. A certification by EASA would unlock global market opportunities beyond China, particularly in regions like Asia-Pacific, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, all of which typically recognize EASA’s regulatory authority without significant additional scrutiny, and don’t have a phobia about China baked into their national DNA. Countries closely aligned with U.S. regulatory frameworks—such as Canada, Japan, and South Korea—might remain hesitant, but the global reach afforded by EASA validation still represents substantial market potential. Notably, all three of those countries have been subject to new tariffs, demands, and in Canada’s case, the threat of annexation, so their openness to non-US alternatives and strategies has increased.

Japan, for example, recently left the the USA without a trade deal, saying that they weren’t even able to get a straight answer about what the country wanted out of a negotiation, and certainly weren’t going to buy 100 year, zero interest bonds. I assessed the weird sane-washing of Trump’s tariffs that’s underway among talking heads and Republican propagandists recently, and found no actually intelligent and educated person not attached to Trump’s inner circle who thought Stephen Miran’s Mar a Lago Accord concept remotely credible or viable, so was unsurprised Japan wasn’t tempted by the zero-yield century bonds.

Strategically, COMAC would also seek to mitigate the risks of a newly created dependence on European suppliers. Anticipating future geopolitical uncertainties, COMAC would likely structure supplier arrangements to minimize vulnerability. This would include diversifying European sources—leveraging suppliers from multiple countries in Europe to avoid single-nation dependency—and accelerating parallel domestic development efforts for critical components. By doing so, COMAC positions itself to manage potential disruptions or policy shifts, ensuring operational resilience in the long run. What will Europe seek to gain from this, and can it deal with China’s strategic corporate and national game playing? I’m not sure. I’ll keep thinking about it.

In the near term, one to two years, COMAC could be delivering 100% US component free planes to China’s domestic market and potentially foreign markets. By 2028 to 2029, COMAC would be delivering 100% domestic Chinese planes to domestic markets and working through international certification through EASA. By 2035, China could reasonably be delivering airplanes that were 100% Chinese made internationally in both narrow body and wide body form factors, displacing Boeing in all of the markets that the United States has been attacking, and competing with Airbus, which has been leaving Boeing in its contrails in recent years. America loses in any scenario.

Ultimately, this strategy would not merely be about immediate decoupling from U.S. aerospace technology but about carefully orchestrated strategic alignment with Europe, grounded in mutual interest. Both sides stand to benefit: COMAC secures immediate production continuity and global certification credibility, while European aerospace firms gain market opportunities previously limited by American dominance. This alignment, although inherently temporary, would buy COMAC critical time—likely five to ten years—to fully develop and mature domestic aerospace technologies. Long-term, the clear objective remains complete aviation independence, with COMAC’s eventual aim of producing aircraft fully equipped with domestically engineered and manufactured engines, avionics, and auxiliary systems.

This pivot is more than just a tactical maneuver—it’s a recognition that China’s aerospace aspirations require deeper global partnerships, a strategic step on the path toward eventual aerospace independence. The speculative strategy outlined here would position COMAC not simply as a victim of escalating geopolitical pressures but as a proactive player leveraging shifting alliances to build a robust and globally competitive aerospace industry capable of operating sustainably outside the American technological and regulatory sphere.