Öcalan Calls for the PKK to Lay Down Arms: An Interview with David McDowall on the Kurdish Predicament

Middle East Centre: What is your reaction to Öcalan’s statement from his island prison?

David McDowall: I have not seen Öcalan’s statement, and I probably would have no particular insights. I have not been following things very closely except to keep an eye on Amberin Zaman’s ouststanding reporting. A few random thoughts: There is a clear shift in the balance of things across the region, and Erdoğan will obviously wish to exploit this shift in Turkey’s favour. If Öcalan has called for the PKK to abandon the armed struggle, as I expect he had, it is not the first time he has done this. What, however, is different is that drone warfare has greatly diminished the PKK’s guerrilla impact, forcing it onto the defensive. In Syria the PYD will be feeling very threatened, since it has no deal with Damascus which now, in any case, probably feels beholden to Turkey. Iran is probably feeling unable or unwilling to assist the PKK since it has enough on its plate at the moment, having suffered such setbacks at the hands of Israel.

Where will it end? I think the next four years are going to be difficult for the Kurds of Turkey and Syria, since the US is no longer a moderating influence on authoritarian rulers, as Trump himself loves them. However, it won’t be as bad for the Kurds as it is going to be for Palestinians. The Middle East is most unlikely to be a happier place by the end of Trump’s tenure as president. Erdoğan, I imagine, will try to ensure that when he gives up power it will be to one of his kin or a close counsellor who will accept Erdoğan’s direction. 

MEC: What future do you see for the PKK and the Kurdish movement in Turkey and northern Syria?

D McD: Many decades ago the Kurds in the region learned to be patient. They will always be ‘substate’ players, and therefore always traded between the rulers of the power centres, and only ‘played’ when it serves the interests of one of these power centres. I have always thought the Kurdish civil movement is the way forward, and that armed conflict was a strategic mistake. The civil movement endured acute state oppression in the 1990s but not only survived but became stronger. I’d like to think that with the PKK disarmed, Erdogan would allow Kurdish politicians out of jail to play a full part in Turkey’s national life, but I’m not at all sure he would allow that, unless the civilian Kurdish movement was dutiful to his own interests, which I think they would find unbearable. So, Turkey’s Kurds must continue to be doggedly patient, taking advantage of whatever freedoms they are given, and persuading the Turkish electorate that the Kurdish population is an asset, not a threat. Syria’s Kurds must somehow persuade Damascus they can be an asset, which means their own demands should be very modest with a view to acquiring more self-administrative powers as trust builds with Damascus. They should politely and graciously slough off US support which has been useful (offering partial protection from Turkey) but also (vis-à-vis the loss of Afrin) treacherous. I find it impossible to judge how overtures to Damascus are likely to pan out. Re-populating Afrin must be a priority, since it has been Kurdish for well over 500 years. But for that it needs Damascus to front the re-assertion of Syrian sovereignty up to the border and remind Turkey that it is Syria’s responsibility to police the border, which it will guarantee (so the PYD must assure Damascus it would co-operate fully, regardless of who or how uniformed the border force would be). ‘Reassurance’, be it to Turkey or to Damascus, must be the central theme of Syrian Kurds navigating their future and winning back areas of occupied Kurdish territory. 

MEC: How might Turkey respond?

D McD: I remain baffled by the Turkish state’s hostility to its subject Kurds. It really does not cost Turkey (except a bit of embarrassment) to embrace its Kurds as Kurds. In fact, it is the only win-win relationship. Turkey has done so much to diminish its own prosperity in the East because of a false and pointless ideology (that everyone are Turks). Just imagine how much it had to gain from a happy, peaceful and prosperous east, where people could call themselves Kurds (as in Britain where Scots can call themselves Scots). It is such a waste, but I see no hint of any Turkish leaders really understanding that. 

MEC: What impact will this have in Iraq?

D McD: The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in government exists only on account of Western intervention, ditto Israel. They will outlast me, but my guess is that the KRG will slowly lose its freedom of action, in its case because I suspect its rulers are eroding the loyalty of their citizens which they enjoyed in 2005 when they struck so successful a deal with Baghdad, thanks to US supervision. To survive, the KRG must enjoy the devotion of its citizens, but it strikes me that Clan Barzani has forfeited that, which makes it much more vulnerable to external pressure.