by Eiman Mohamed
In early February 2024, ten months into the conflict in Sudan between SAF (Sudanese Armed Forces) and RSF (Rapid Support Forces), internet services provided by the country’s three major telecommunications providers—Zain, MTN, and Sudani—were abruptly cut. In the following days, the CEO of Zain Sudan stated that the RSF had orchestrated the blackout by cutting off the electricity supply to data centres within their controlled zones. As of now, major states under RSF control, such as the Darfurs and parts of Khartoum, remain offline, while in ‘safe states’ controlled by the SAF, telecommunication providers have successfully restored internet services.
Sudan’s Internet Shutdowns: A Decade-Long Tool of Oppression
Long before the start of the current conflict, internet shutdowns had become a familiar weapon in the hands of those in power. For over a decade, cutting off digital communication has been a go-to strategy for controlling the narrative and limiting the population’s ability to mobilise. The first major recorded internet blackout in Sudan dates back to 2013, during the rule of Omar al-Bashir and amid the Arab Spring protests, when the government shutdown access as a response to protests in Khartoum. Fast forward to 2018, during mass protests against al-Bashir, the government took a slightly different approach by selectively blocking access to social media platforms, forcing citizens to rely on VPNs to stay reach those websites.
After al-Bashir’s fall, and under General al-Burhan, internet blackouts became even more frequent, with nearly 16 verified shutdowns according to reports. Each time Sudan faced political turmoil – whether it was mass protests or communal violence—the government resorted to this method to control information flow. Also, beyond politics, internet shutdowns in Sudan have also been enforced during national secondary school exams, allegedly to prevent cheating. The most recent incident occurred in December 2024 – more than 20 months into the ongoing conflict—suggesting that authorities have no intention of abandoning this strategy anytime soon.
Internet Shutdowns as a Weapon of War
This time, the difference lies in the actors perpetrating the shutdowns. Previously, internet disruptions were primarily a tactic employed by the Sudanese government to suppress dissent. Now, both the SAF and the RSF are utilising shutdowns to control information flow within territories held by the opposing side. Reports suggest the February 2024 shutdown was initiated by the RSF in retaliation for internet disruptions in Darfur, a region where the RSF holds significant political influence – an allegation both the SAF and telecommunication companies deny. Regardless of the specific motivations, the catastrophic implications of these internet shutdowns for the Sudanese population remain undeniable.
Labelled as one of the world’s worst humanitarian crisis, Sudan has seen more than 11 million people internally displaced, with famine declared in some parts of the country. Internet shutdowns have exacerbated this crisis, blocking access to critical financial services like Bankak, Sudan’s most widely used e-banking application. Bankak has become a lifeline for many Sudanese citizens due to the conflict-driven cash scarcity and growing reliance on remittances from relatives overseas. This disruption during an economic crisis directly undermines the right to life, preventing individuals from accessing funds necessary for survival, such as those needed to purchase food and medicine. Furthermore, social media has become a crucial tool for those trapped in areas of heavy combat operations and seeking escape. Reports indicate that many Sudanese citizens rely heavily on these platforms to identify the safest routes to reach secure zones.
Starlink Under Siege: A Lifeline Turned Weapon in Sudan’s Conflict
Alternatively, as a result of the continued internet shutdown dependency on satellite communication namely Starlink by the tech giant SpaceX has surged in RSF-controlled zones, RSF members reportedly sell internet access to civilians, and although Starlink devices allowed for the continuation of the much-needed internet service for citizens and aid groups in this dire situation, nevertheless its usage raised major concerns.
First, purchasing an hour of internet connection through Starlink costs approximately up to £4.76 in some states, a substantial expense that benefits RSF members financially but diverts already-scarce funds from essential needs, particularly in a country grappling with hyperinflation and skyrocketing prices of basic goods. Second, citizens must often access the service near militant checkpoints, putting their lives at risk either from SAF airstrikes or arbitrary phone searches that could lead to capture, torture or kidnapping in exchange of a ransom by the RSF, thus creating a climate of fear and further striping citizens of their dignity. Third, the use of Starlink satellite services – which remain underregulated locally – has a more sinister purpose as it been used to control drones by the RSF which more often than not has been used to shell heavily populated areas including hospitals.
Most recently, following a string of SAF victories in Khartoum, the RSF reportedly began confiscating and burning Starlink devices – to allegedly sever communication channels that could expose their retreat, disregarding the devastating consequences on local communities. This act underscores the troubling pattern of systematic weaponisation that is used by the RSF to serve its interests, whether by profiting from its access, exploiting it for military gains, or eliminating it entirely when it no longer serves its agenda.
The practice of internet shutdowns is deeply embedded in Sudan’s approach to internet governance. With over 11 years of experience, the government has adapted and weaponised shutdowns as a tool of control. However, the ongoing conflict has introduced new players who have adopted the same repressive tactics from the old playbook, further trapping Sudanese civilians between the hammer of staying online under dangerous conditions and the anvil of complete digital isolation. And with the war in Sudan seemingly slowing down, the question remains – will internet shutdowns persist as a long-term strategy of control?
This piece is part of a series that addresses the conflict as well as other subjects pertaining to Sudan, such as employment, forced displacement, gender, humanitarian needs, migration and political participation.
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